Fourteen questions on what defends Canada against nuclear attack. The Government will not say whether one record exists.
Requests filed 29–31 August 2026 · answered by National Defence on 17 September 2026 · published 24 September 2026 · Danilo Dzyuban, Ottawa
Canada has no nuclear weapons. Its defence against a nuclear attack rests on the assurances of allies. Three requests under the Access to Information Act asked the Department of National Defence for whatever it holds on those assurances: any assessment of their reliability, the instrument in which any obligation to defend Canada is written down, the plan for nuclear attack that a statute requires the Minister to prepare, and the nuclear certification of the aircraft Canada is buying. Fourteen numbered items in all. On 17 September 2026 the Department answered all three requests with the same two sentences. It will not say whether a single record exists.
What was asked
The three requests were filed on 29, 30 and 31 August 2026 and registered as files A-2026-01143, A-2026-01144 and A-2026-01154. Each asked that, where no record exists for an item, the answer say so item by item. The items, as the Department itself quotes them in its letters:
| File | Item |
|---|---|
| 01143 · 1 | Any assessment of the reliability, legal enforceability, or durability of assurances given by any allied state to defend Canada against nuclear attack |
| 01143 · 2 | Any analysis, cost estimate, feasibility study, or option paper concerning an independent Canadian nuclear deterrent, or concerning Canadian nuclear latency or a recessed deterrent capability |
| 01143 · 3 | Any briefing note prepared for the Minister addressing Canada's options if extended nuclear deterrence provided by an allied state were withdrawn, conditioned, or reduced |
| 01143 · 4 | Any record concerning the nuclear certification status of aircraft acquired or to be acquired by Canada |
| 01144 · 1 | Any record identifying the instrument in which an obligation of any state to defend Canada against nuclear attack is recorded, or stating that no such instrument exists |
| 01144 · 2 | Any record concerning the consequences for the defence of Canada of two events. The termination of the Agreement on the North American Aerospace Defense Command of 28 April 2006 under its 12-month notice provision. The denunciation of the North Atlantic Treaty by any Party under Article 13 of that Treaty |
| 01144 · 3 | Any record concerning contingency planning for a reduction, conditioning or withdrawal of United States participation in the defence of North America |
| 01144 · 4 | Any record assessing statements made publicly by officials of the United States on three subjects. The annexation of Canada. The accession of Canada as a state of the United States. An alteration of the international boundary |
| 01144 · 5 | Any record concerning whether Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty obliges any Party to respond to a nuclear attack on Canada with nuclear weapons |
| 01154 · 1 | Any emergency management plan prepared under section 6(1)(a) of the Emergency Management Act in respect of nuclear attack on Canada |
| 01154 · 2 | Any emergency management plan prepared under that section in respect of war or other armed conflict affecting Canada |
| 01154 · 3 | Any list, register or inventory of the risks the Minister has identified under section 6(1). This item covers risks within the area of the Department and risks related to it |
| 01154 · 4 | Any record of a test, exercise or training activity conducted under section 6(1)(c) about a plan described in item 1 or item 2 |
| 01154 · 5 | Any record concerning whether nuclear attack on Canada has been identified as a risk under section 6(1) and, if it has not, any record explaining why |
What the Department answered
Three letters dated 17 September 2026, over the signature block of the Executive Director, Access to Information and Privacy, National Defence. The operative passage is the same in all three, to the word:
We regret to advise you that this Department neither confirms nor denies records exist pursuant to section 10(2) of the Access to Information Act. If the documentation did exist, it would be exempted in its entirety pursuant to section 15(1) of the Access to Information Act.
National Defence, files A-2026-01143, A-2026-01144 and A-2026-01154, 17 September 2026 · the three letters in full
No record was released. No item was answered on its own. Forty-six words cover fourteen items on different subjects across two different periods. The Department did not say that the records do not exist. It refused to say whether they exist.
The two provisions the Department relied on
10 (2) The head of a government institution may but is not required to indicate under subsection (1) whether a record exists.
15 (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Part that contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities […]
Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, ss. 10 (2) and 15 (1), as captured on 24 September 2026
Both provisions confer a discretion. Subsection 15 (1) turns on a reasonable expectation of injury from the particular information; section 25 requires the head of the institution to disclose any part of a record that can reasonably be severed; subsection 4 (2.1) requires the institution to respond to the request “accurately and completely”. One sentence applied unchanged to fourteen items, three files and two periods is the record of a discretion that was not exercised on any of them.
The plan the statute requires
6 (1) The emergency management responsibilities of each minister accountable to Parliament for a government institution are to identify the risks that are within or related to his or her area of responsibility — including those related to critical infrastructure — and to do the following in accordance with the policies, programs and other measures established by the Minister: (a) prepare emergency management plans in respect of those risks; (b) maintain, test and implement those plans; and (c) conduct exercises and training in relation to those plans.
6 (2) An emergency management plan […] (d) in the case of war or other armed conflict, the programs, arrangements or other measures that (i) support the overall defence effort, (ii) support the Canadian Forces and the armed forces of Canada’s allies in the conduct of military operations, (iii) contribute to meeting Canada’s military and civil wartime obligations to its allies, and (iv) mitigate the effects of foreign armed conflict on Canada.
Emergency Management Act, S.C. 2007, c. 15, ss. 6 (1) and 6 (2) (d), as captured on 24 September 2026
The statute names the case of war in its own words. File A-2026-01154 asked whether the plan for nuclear attack exists, whether nuclear attack has been identified as a risk at all, and for the register of risks the Minister has identified. The answer covers two states of the world without distinguishing them: the plan exists and is withheld, or the plan does not exist and the duty in subsection 6 (1) has not been performed. Subsection 10 (2) is being used to hide which.
The same gap is visible in the one federal risk instrument that is public. Public Safety Canada’s National Risk Profile, first public report, 2023, runs to 179 pages and 55,574 words. Searched in full on 24 September 2026: “war”, 0 occurrences; “armed conflict”, 0; “armed attack”, 0; “invasion”, 0. “Nuclear” appears 3 times: once as a response resource, twice in a list of hazards for future rounds. The case that paragraph 6 (2) (d) names is absent from the published profile of the country’s risks.
The treaties are published. The Department will not say whether it has read them
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 4 April 1949, Article 5
Either Party may terminate this Agreement upon twelve months’ written notice to the other Party.
Agreement between Canada and the United States on the North American Aerospace Defense Command, 28 April 2006, Article IV
Article 5 obliges each ally to take the action it deems necessary. It names no weapon and no ally. Item 1 of file A-2026-01144 asked which instrument records an obligation of any state to defend Canada against nuclear attack, and accepted in the alternative a record stating that no such instrument exists. Item 5 asked whether Article 5 obliges any Party to answer a nuclear attack on Canada with nuclear weapons. Item 2 asked about the consequences of the twelve-month notice in the NORAD Agreement. On all three the Department neither confirms nor denies that it holds a record.
The certification an ally announced
Item 4 of file A-2026-01143 asked for records on the nuclear certification status of the aircraft Canada is acquiring. Canada is buying 88 F-35A. On 8 March 2024 a spokesman for the F-35 Joint Program Office told Breaking Defense that the F-35A had been certified to carry the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, and that the certification was achieved on 12 October 2023. The Department applies subsection 15 (1), injury to the defence of Canada or of an allied state, to the existence of records about a certification the allied state announced itself.
What the Minister said, and what the Department will not say
On 2 February 2026 the former Chief of the Defence Staff, General (retired) Wayne Eyre, told an event of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute in Ottawa: “I would argue that we will never have true strategic independence, absent our own nuclear deterrent.” On 3 February 2026 the Minister of National Defence told reporters: “Canada has absolutely no intention of pursuing nuclear weapons.” He said the government is committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
That position rests on one thing: the assurance of allies. Seven months later the Minister’s Department will not say whether it holds any assessment of that assurance, any note on Canada’s options if it were withdrawn or conditioned, or any plan for the case the assurance is meant to cover. On 20 September 2026 the Conference of Defence Associations, whose Institute hosted the general, wrote that nuclear policy “is principally a matter of government policy and political decision-making and is not a core area of our advocacy”.
The American side of the same command
NORAD is a binational command. A Freedom of Information Act request for the cost of the defence of Canadian territory and the NORAD mission went to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM FOIA office on 19 September 2026. On 23 September the office wrote:
NORAD as a bi-national organization is not subject to the Access to Information Act (ATIA) requests. In coordination with Directorate Access to Information and Privacy, personnel posted to HQ NORAD should not be tasked with ATIA requests. All records under the control of DND are subject to the Act, but documents and IT systems used by personnel posted to HQ NORAD are not physically under the Department’s control.
FOIA and Privacy office, NORAD and USNORTHCOM, 23 September 2026 · the message in full
So the American office states, in writing and in coordination with National Defence, that the records of the command charged with warning of an attack on Canada are outside Canada’s access law and outside the Department’s control. A request for the same records, filed with National Defence on 23 September 2026, will show whether the Canadian side agrees.
What follows
Three complaints are before the Information Commissioner of Canada, filed on 20 September 2026, one per file. Each asks the Commissioner to find that a discretion applied by one sentence to fourteen items was not exercised, that section 25 was not applied, and that subsection 10 (2) cannot be used to conceal whether a duty owed to Parliament under subsection 6 (1) of the Emergency Management Act has been performed. After the Commissioner’s report, section 41 of the Access to Information Act opens the Federal Court. The same three questions went to the Minister of National Defence in writing on 20 September 2026, with 4 October 2026 as the date for an answer. A brief is before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, filed on 29 August 2026; written testimony was distributed to the members of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs on 22 September 2026. A bill is drafted.
The record
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2 Feb 2026 | General (retired) Wayne Eyre, at an event of the CDA Institute in Ottawa: no true strategic independence absent a Canadian deterrent. |
| 3 Feb 2026 | The Minister of National Defence to reporters: “Canada has absolutely no intention of pursuing nuclear weapons.” |
| 29–31 Aug 2026 | Three access requests filed with National Defence; brief filed with the Commons defence committee; written testimony filed with the Senate committee. |
| 17 Sept 2026 | National Defence answers all three files with the same forty-six words. |
| 20 Sept 2026 | Letters received. Three complaints filed with the Information Commissioner. Three questions put to the Minister in writing. The Conference of Defence Associations: nuclear policy “is not a core area of our advocacy”. |
| 22 Sept 2026 | The Senate committee’s clerk: the testimony was shared with the members that day. |
| 23 Sept 2026 | The NORAD and USNORTHCOM FOIA office: HQ NORAD records are not subject to Canada’s access law and not under the Department’s control. A mirror request filed with National Defence the same day. |
| 24 Sept 2026 | This finding published. Put in writing the same day to thirty-four addressees. In Canada: two Members of Parliament, the Commons committees on foreign affairs and on public safety, the Senate committee on foreign affairs, the Parliamentary Budget Officer, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Emergency Management, the Department’s media office, five institutes and two newsrooms; answers due 8 October 2026. Abroad: the foreign affairs and defence committees of the Parliaments of Australia and the United Kingdom, the European Parliament’s subcommittee on security and defence, the United States House Committee on Armed Services, seven institutes and six newsrooms; answers due 15 October 2026. |
| 24 Sept 2026 | The NORAD and USNORTHCOM FOIA office assigns Case Number 26-R-057 to the request of 19 September, accepts all four items with every search term as sent, and decides the fee waiver in three words: “Fee Waiver: Denied”. An appeal on the fee waiver goes to the Department’s appellate authority the same day. |
| 25 Sept 2026 | The secretariat of the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade answers within seven hours: the Committee holds no record of an obligation of Australia to defend Canada against nuclear attack, the matter is outside its remit, and it refers the question to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. |
| 25 Sept 2026 | Requests filed with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence of Australia under the Freedom of Information Act 1982, and with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, for the instrument of each ally’s assurance and its conditions. The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee written to. A reply to the Australian secretariat contesting each sentence of its answer. |
Verification
Every quotation above is taken from a captured file. SHA-256, first sixteen characters: National Defence letters A-2026-01143 a25958d67664912a, A-2026-01144 ee3b11af5ff0a2aa, A-2026-01154 c7cf78c94148e0e4 (PDF as released through Canada Post Connect, 20 September 2026); Access to Information Act, full consolidated text, Justice Laws Website, 24 September 2026 fdfe7cdd3ecf07e5; Emergency Management Act, same source and date 23504fcb04e17849; North Atlantic Treaty, nato.int a63656650dffe629; NORAD Agreement, Canada Treaty Series E105060 773e001b73a8b3bd; National Risk Profile, Public Safety Canada, 2023 03edfe7120e3edf7; The Globe and Mail, 2 and 3 February 2026 e8468a116a098704, f0c3c13bcb436c48; The Canadian Press via National Newswatch, 3 February 2026 c4cddbcd27f64838; Breaking Defense, 8 March 2024 4750574424da7531; NORAD and USNORTHCOM FOIA office message, 23 September 2026 f9c904eb2f07dbdc; NORAD and USNORTHCOM acknowledgement letter, Case Number 26-R-057, 24 September 2026, PDF 62799eda0bc66ea9. The statute passages are also collected in statutes as captured. The word counts of the National Risk Profile were produced by extracting the text of the PDF and counting whole-word matches; anyone with the file can repeat them.
Citation: Danilo Dzyuban, “Fourteen questions on what defends Canada against nuclear attack. The Government will not say whether one record exists.” (24 September 2026).